Morality is its own Reward by Elizondo, E. Sonny
Morality is its own Reward
e. sonny elizondo
University of California, Santa Barbara
Email: eselizondo@philosophy.ucsb.edu
Abstract
Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents’
well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this thought into
question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they assume,
in line with the tradition, that happiness is all there is to well-being – an
assumption which, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and
empiricism about happiness, implies that morality and well-being are at
best extrinsically related. Drawing on Kant’s underappreciated discussion
of self-contentment, an intellectual analogue of happiness, I reconstruct an
alternative account of morality’s relation to well-being. Morality is
intrinsically related to well-being – and so is its own reward – not because it
makes us happy but because it makes us self-contented.
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It has seemed to many a condition on the correct ethical theory that it
plausibly connect morality to the sources of humanwell-being. Those who
have insisted on this condition have tended, in the main, to be ill-disposed
towards Kant. One important reason for this disposition is the apparent
difficulty Kant has in fitting morality and happiness together in a single
human life. The traditional and by now familiar story goes something like
this. The concerns of morality – duty, reason, respect – are so different
from the concerns of happiness – interest, inclination, pleasure – that
reconciliation between the two is impossible. We can be moral, or we can
be happy, but we cannot, save for supernatural assistance, be both.1
Though still influential, this traditional reading of Kant no longer
predominates, at least not among serious interpreters. Indeed, much of the
best recent work on Kant’s ethics makes a powerful case that a morally
good life, in moderately favourable circumstances, will be anything but
miserable. Not only does morality leave us ample room to pursue our
happiness, or at least the permissible parts of it. It also allows and even
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insists that our happiness itself be transformed, so that, in general, the same
activities that make us good also make us happy.2
Details aside, this work constitutes a significant step forward for Kantian
ethics: we can, under the right conditions, be both moral and happy.
That said, I worry that even this modern form of Kantianism fails to
provide everything one might reasonably want in an account of morality’s
connection to well-being. In particular, though the modern Kantians allow
us to live well and to livemorally, they do not – or at least do not obviously –
allow us to live well in living morally, in the sense that morality is in and of
itself a source of well-being, something that makes our lives go well. The
reason is that the modern Kantians, no less than their traditional forebears,
tend to make two important assumptions: first, that happiness is all there is
to well-being; and second, that while morality is a rational business, an
activity of (practical) intellect, happiness is an empirical one, a state of
sensibility. Taken together, these assumptions imply that morality’s relation
to well-being is entirely extrinsic. Since morality can only make our lives go
well by making us happy, and since morality can only make us happy by
influencing our sensibility, morality is not its own reward – not really.
It is simply the condition for some separate benefit.
Now, while there is little question that Kant accepts the second of the
above assumptions – that morality is rational and happiness empirical –
I think there is good reason to doubt that he accepts the first – that
well-being is exhausted by happiness. Consequently, it is open to Kant to
claim that morality makes our lives go well but not by making us happy.
And so, I think, he does, in his discussion of a condition he calls
‘self-contentment’, ‘an analogue of happiness that must necessarily
accompany consciousness of virtue’ (KpV, 5: 117).3
The significance of self-contentment has been largely overlooked, and not
without reason. Kant says little about this condition, at least in his
canonical works, and what he does say is in various ways problematic.
Nonetheless, Kantian theory provides resources for working out a more
adequate account of self-contentment, resources that Kant himself could
have deployed but did not. My aim in this article, then, is to draw out
these resources and to develop such an account, one that makes plain
how and why self-contentment is uniquely suited to serve as a bridge
between morality and well-being.
More specifically, I will advance and defend two main claims.
First, properly understood, well-being is a genus with two species: one
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sensible – happiness – and one intellectual – self-contentment. Thus since
humans are both sensible and intellectual beings, their well-being includes
both happiness and self-contentment. Second, self-contentment, unlike
happiness, is essentially moral. Thus while morality can only be extrinsically
related to happiness, it can be, and indeed is, intrinsically related to
self-contentment and thereby to well-being. If this is right, thenmorality and
well-being are more intimately related than even Kant’s most sympathetic
interpreters have thought. For though there is more to living well than living
morally – self-contentment is only part of our well-being, not the whole
of it – morality is nonetheless its own reward.
1
I begin by examining Kant’s conception of happiness. This is not an easy
task, as Kant’s explicit comments on happiness are scattered, relatively
brief and, superficially at least, difficult to reconcile with one another and
with other aspects of his work. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern the
outlines of a unified account, one that suggests a more complicated
relation between well-being and happiness than is usually supposed.
I count (at least) three different views of happiness in Kant, each
privileging a different condition: satisfaction of the inclinations, pleasure
and well-being. The first view understands happiness as the sum of the
satisfaction of inclinations (KrV, A800/B828, A806/B834; G, 4: 399,
405). The second view understands happiness as some sort of good
feeling, pleasure or, as Kant often says, agreeableness (KpV, 5: 22,KU, 5:
208). The third view understands happiness as well-being or welfare,
what makes an agent’s life go well for her (G, 4: 393, 418).4
Kant does not explicitly distinguish these views of happiness. He moves
back and forth between them without any acknowledgement that they
are or even might be different. But they clearly are different. For example,
getting what you want and feeling pleased – even when you are pleased
because you have gotten what you want – are simply different things. The
one depends on the fit between your psychology and the world; the other
depends, in the first instance at least, on your psychology alone. As for
well-being, it is not entirely clear what Kant has in mind here. On the one
hand, one could construe the view formally: an agent is happy when her
life goes well for her, whatever that comes to. On the other hand, one
could construe the view substantively: an agent is happy when her life
goes well for her, and her life goes well for her when she… The formal
construal is consistent with a variety of different accounts of well-being
and so happiness, while the substantive construal is not. On neither
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construal, though, is the third view identical to the first or second, if only
because these views make no obvious claim about what makes an agent’s
life go well for her.
However, Kant’s easy equivalence between these views of happiness gives
some reason to think that, in characterizing happiness in terms of the
satisfaction of inclination or pleasure, he does take himself to be
characterizing what makes an agent’s life go well for her. This suggests that
the third view, at least on the formal construal, is consistent with the first two
views; these views are simply fuller accounts of what makes a life go well.
But not all of Kant’s comments about well-being support the formal
construal. Kant often seems to have something quite particular in mind
when he speaks of well-being. For example, in the second Critique, Kant
explicitly distinguishes good (Gut) and well-being (Wohl). Good
concerns, in the first instance, objects of the will, towards which reason
directs us, while well-being concerns the feeling of agreeableness, which
Kant clearly identifies with sensible pleasure (KpV, 5: 60, KU 5: 205,
A, 7: 230). Such comments seem to support a substantive rather than
formal construal of well-being: an agent is happy when her life goes well
for her, and her life goes well for her when she is pleased. Moreover, if
this construal is correct, then Kant in fact has only two different views of
happiness: happiness as the satisfaction of inclinations and happiness as
agreeableness. The inclusion of the concept of well-being would still add
something to Kant’s account – it would add that views of happiness are
also views of what makes a life go well for an agent – but it would not
provide any genuine rival to the other two views.
Kant does not, however, always identify well-being with agreeableness.
Indeed, in the Dialectic of the second Critique, Kant clearly, if not explicitly,
denies just this identification. For there he defines beatitude, or blessedness, as
a ‘complete well-being (Wohl) independent of all contingent causes in the
world’ (KpV, 5: 123). This definition is important, since Kant is clear that
there is only one being in the world (or even beyond it) who is truly blessed,
and that is God (KpV, 5: 131, VpR, 28: 1089–91). But notice: on Kant’s
traditional view of divinity, divine nature excludes anything sensible; since
God cannot be affected by anything – not even himself – he has no sensibility
and so, a fortiori, no sensible pleasures (VpR, 28: 1051, KrV, B71).5
Thus if God possesses blessedness, and so well-being, but lacks sensibility,
thenwell-being cannot be identifiedwith agreeableness. It must be something
more general, something that can be intelligibly applied to both divine and
human beings alike.
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This requirement might seem to favour the formal construal of
well-being, since on this construal it is easy to see how Kant’s account of
well-being could meet the requirement. So long as both God and humans
have lives that can go well, it will make sense to speak of well-being in
both cases. That said, I want to explore the possibility that Kant actually
does accept a substantive construal of well-being, one that applies both to
God and to us.
Such exploration will require attention to Kant’s theological views. This
might seem an unusual and unpromising tack to take. The problem is not
merely that appeals to divine nature seem prima facie suspect, especially
for someone like Kant, for whom rational theology is a paradigm of
corrupt metaphysics. It is also that, whatever epistemic reservations we
have about theology, we can be fairly confident that if there is a God, he is
quite different from us – so different in fact that significant assertions of
continuity are bound to seem dubious.
Though not unreasonable, these considerations should not deter us from
making use of Kant’s theology. Though Kant denies that we have
theoretical cognition of God, he does not deny that we can think
constructively about God. Indeed, he thinks we can say quite a lot about
divine nature without thereby committing ourselves to divine existence.
That is, we can confidently make statements of the form: if there were a
God, hewould have to be like this…6Kant clearly extends such conditional
assertions to the case of divine psychology. His method is to draw on our
understanding of our own faculties and extrapolate from there, by
cancelling the limitations to which our psychology is subject (VpR, 28:
1048). For example, Kant regards it as a limitation of our cognitive faculty
that our understanding can apprehend particulars only through the use of
concepts. Thus God’s understanding, which must be unlimited, is not
discursive but intuitive (VpR, 28: 1050). As Kant sees it, then, the same
mental kinds can be attributed to God and to us. It is just that in the divine
case the instantiations of these kinds are perfect and in our case they are not.
So long as we are attentive to these differences, there seems to be no barrier
to using one species of mind to illuminate another.
Moreover, adverting to Kant’s theological views in such contexts is not
merely something we can do. It is something we should do. After all,
Kant is clear that the first, though by no means only, topic of practical
philosophy is rational nature as such and not merely its human
instantiation. Marking this distinction, however, is likely to be a
challenge, so long as the only example of rational nature we have is our
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own. But if Kant is right that we can think constructively about God, then
we are not so restricted. For in the case of God, we have an example of
pure rational nature: a clean case, so to speak, that we can then use to
shed light on the messier case of human beings, to disentangle what
properly belongs to reason and what has its origin elsewhere.
While one might readily accept the relevance of such analogies to our
understanding of morality, which is obviously rational, one might well be
more sceptical of their relevance to our understanding of well-being,
which Kant clearly associates with happiness and so, it seems, with
sensibility. It is precisely this scepticism, however, that I mean to
question. There is surely something about well-being that is merely
sensible. But the fact that Kant attributes well-being to God suggests that
the simple identification of well-being with sensibility cannot be right.
Just as morality has a root in reason, so too may well-being, at least
in part. Such a connection is likely to remain obscure so long as one
attends only to Kant’s discussion of human beings. Adverting to Kant’s
discussion of God might therefore provide a valuable corrective.
2
Kant gives some indication of a substantive construal of well-being, one
that applies both to God and to us, in the second Critique. Consider his
claim that
to be happy is necessarily the demand of every rational but finite
being and therefore an unavoidable determining ground of its
faculty of desire. For, satisfaction (Zufriedenheit) with one’s
whole existence is not, as it were, an original possession and a
beatitude, which would presuppose a consciousness of one’s
independent self-sufficiency, but is instead a problem imposed
upon him by his finite nature itself, because he is needy… (KpV,
5: 25)
Kant’s thought here is somewhat obscure, but the key notion is clearly
‘satisfaction with one’s whole existence’, which is plainly meant to stand
in for happiness.7 Kant does not explain what he means by satisfaction
with one’s whole existence. He often associates satisfaction with
pleasure, and given his previous definition of happiness in terms of
agreeableness, this is exactly what one would expect. Satisfaction with
one’s existence is a kind of pervasive good feeling or, as he at one point
puts it, ‘a rational being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life
uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence’ (KpV, 5: 22).
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We should not be so quick to endorse this interpretation of satisfaction,
however, since some of what Kant says here seems inconsistent with it.
For example, he claims that satisfaction with one’s whole existence is not,
for a finite being, a ‘beatitude’ or ‘original possession’ but ‘a problem
imposed upon him by his finite nature itself’ (KpV, 5: 25). This claim
seems to presuppose that an infinite being can be, and indeed is, satisfied
with its whole existence originally, that is, by nature. And since, as we
saw earlier, Kant thinks that an infinite being does not possess sensible
feelings, he cannot think that satisfaction with one’s existence is simply a
matter of agreeableness. It must be something more.
We find a clue to the nature of satisfaction in another translation of the
German word Zufriedenheit. Instead of satisfaction with one’s whole
existence, we can speak of contentment with one’s whole existence.8
This alternative invites a different interpretation of satisfaction than that
considered above. For example, in calling someone contentedwe seem to be
suggesting not, or not necessarily, that she feels any particular pleasure.
Rather, we are suggesting that she is motivated to remain in her current
condition and, in this sense, is satisfied with it. Consider the contentment of
a good meal, after which one simply sits back comfortably in one’s
chair, not because one cannot move – though perhaps one cannot: the
Thanksgiving problem – but because one has no impulse to do so.
One might, in such a moment, feel some pleasure, but such pleasure
does not, I think, make for contentment. It is a distinct, if frequently
co-occurring, element of such circumstances.
Making out Kant’s claim in terms of contentment seems consonant with
the use to which he subsequently puts the concept of satisfaction with
one’s whole existence. Recall Kant’s claim that satisfaction – hereafter,
contentment – with one’s whole existence is a ‘problem imposed upon
[the human being] by his finite nature itself, because he is needy’ (KpV, 5:
25). How might the presence of need present a problem for our
contentment, understood in the above terms? In order to answer this
question, we must first understand better what Kant means by ‘need’.
There is a common-sense notion of need that restricts needs to necessities.
I need something if I cannot, in some strong sense, do without it. In the
absence of the needed thing, I will suffer some significant harm or fail to
achieve some necessary purpose or something of the sort. Genuine needs
thus contrast sharply with mere wants. I genuinely need food, but I merely
want an HDTV. Without food, I will die. Without an HDTV, I will simply
have to forgo the pleasure of peering into the newsman’s pores.
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Now Kant does have a notion of need that is in this way restrictive. He
calls such needs ‘true needs’, and he includes among these whatever is
necessary tomaintain our rational capacities. But Kant also seems to have
a more general, more promiscuous notion of need, and I think it is this
notion that is dominant in the current discussion.9 This notion of need
maintains some connection to necessities, but the necessity is not of the
sort exemplified by true needs. Absence of the needed thing does not have
to result in significant harm or the like. All it must result in is some
measure of discontentment with one’s existence. So, for example, though
I will not suffer significant harm in the absence of an HDTV, the fact that
I want one certainly has a bearing on my contentment, in the above sense.
That is to say, if I want but do not have an HDTV, then I will not be
motivated to remain in my current condition. Quite the opposite. I will be
motivated to change my condition – in particular, I will be motivated to
do what is necessary to obtain the TV. Though it may sound strange to
say (without evident exaggeration) that I need consumer electronics,
I think this is the sort of thing that Kant has in mind. To need a thing is
simply to lack a thing and to be, in virtue of this lack, discontented with
one’s existence, that is, to be motivated to change one’s condition so as to
obtain the thing that one lacks.
If this is the right way to construe contentment, then it seems plausible to
think that both finite and infinite beings can be contented with their
existence. After all, a subject is contented with her existence when she is
motivated to remain in her current condition. Since God lacks nothing
and so needs nothing, this seems to describe his condition exactly. Finite
beings, however, do not have it quite so easy. Our contentment is, as Kant
says, ‘a problem’. If a finite being is a needy being, and need is construed
in terms of discontentment, then any finite being must thereby contend
with the possibility of discontentment. This is not necessarily to say that
such a being can never be contented with her existence. It is simply to
say that if she is so contented, this is not because she, by nature, lacks
nothing. It is because she has successfully obtained what she previously
lacked. Such is the predicament of created beings, who are, as Kant says,
‘always dependent with regard to what is required for a complete
contentment with [their] condition’ (KpV, 5: 84).
It seems, then, as if contentment with one’s existence is the kind of thing
that can be intelligibly applied to both divine and human natures.
Moreover, this broad applicability suggests that contentment is a
good candidate for well-being, construed substantively.10 Given this
substantive construal, we can retain the genuine distinction between the
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three views of happiness under discussion: happiness as satisfaction of
inclination, happiness as agreeableness, and happiness as well-being –
now, contentment. I noted above that the first two views are rather
obviously different, and it should by now be equally obvious that the
third view is different as well. Given these differences, can we make sense
of why Kant would so easily associate them? I think we can.
3
The key to understanding the connection between Kant’s three views of
happiness is to see the first and second views as in some way falling under
the third, that is, to see the satisfaction of inclination and feelings of
agreeableness as things that bear on a subject’s contentment. This
assumes, of course, that the subject in question is finite. Again, God is
contented but lacks inclination and feeling. I will return to divine
contentment shortly, but I want to focus first on why human contentment
and so happiness is bound up with these empirical elements, as Kant
evidently thinks.
In order to see how the satisfaction of inclination and feelings of
agreeableness bear on a finite subject’s contentment, I must say something
more about howKant understands inclinations and agreeableness. To have
an inclination is to be motivated to pursue an object on account of the
agreeableness that one expects from the existence of that object (G, 4: 413,
MS, 6: 212,A, 7: 251). For example, if I findmyself thinking about the nice,
cold bottle of beer I will be able to drink after work, I may begin to
anticipate the agreeableness I will experience at the first, delicious draught.
This anticipation may then motivate me to undertake steps to obtain that
beer, as soon as I am able to do so. Put this way, it is not hard to see that
inclination and need will be closely connected. If I have an inclination for
the beer, I will, in the absence of the beer, be motivated to change my
condition so as to obtain it. I will, to that extent, have a need for it.
This suggests that achieving contentment with one’s existence will
necessarily involve attention to one’s inclinations. What form this
attention takes may differ depending on the circumstances. Kant clearly
thinks that the standard case is one of satisfaction: if you have an
inclination for a beer, the natural thing to do is to drink one. But in other
cases the attention may be less straightforward, e.g. strategies of
adaptation, suppression or, at the limit, extirpation. In all cases, however,
something must be done if the subject is ever to be contented with her
existence. For so long as she is inclined, she is in need; and so long as she is
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in need, she is discontented. This is why Kant says of inclinations that
‘discontent always accompanies them’ (KpV, 5: 118).11
What of agreeableness? As I noted above, inclinations are generated by
anticipations of agreeableness. So it seems natural to think, as Kant does
think, that, at least in normal cases, the satisfaction of inclination in fact
produces agreeableness.
Despite the complicated and confusing surface of Kant’s discussion
of happiness, then, there seems to be an underlying structure. Most
fundamentally, happiness is a kind of well-being and so contentment. The
satisfaction of inclination and feelings of agreeableness are important to
happiness but only because they bear on contentment. As finite beings,
our contentment is hostage to our needs: we are completely contented
only when our needs are met. Since our needs are connected to
our inclinations, Kant associates happiness with the satisfaction of
inclination. And since feelings of agreeableness are marks of the
satisfaction of inclination, Kant associates happiness with agreeableness.
4
If this is the right way to think about happiness, then it should be obvious
that the relation between happiness and well-being is more complicated
than it at first appears. Strictly speaking, Kant does not identify happiness
and well-being. Rather, he subsumes happiness under well-being.
Happiness is a species of well-being. More specifically, it is the sensible
species of well-being: the contentment that arises from inclinations and
associated feelings.
But as the case of God clearly shows, happiness is not the only species of
well-being that Kant admits. For recall, Kant attributes well-being to
God, who lacks sensibility. Thus in addition to sensible well-being – in
addition to happiness – Kant must also admit a non-sensible species of
well-being: a contentment that arises not from inclination or feeling but
from reason. Contrary to appearances, then, the Kantian account of
well-being is not exhausted by the Kantian account of happiness. It also
includes a non-sensible, intellectual species of well-being, exemplified
by God.
Now one might immediately question the significance of this conclusion.
For even if I am right that Kant allows God to live well without being
happy, it does not follow that he allows us to do the same. After all, many
things are true of God that are not true of us, especially as concerns the
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powers of pure reason. If I really want to show, then, that the Kantian
account of human well-being is not exhausted by the Kantian account
of happiness, I must give reason to think that Kant extends intellectual
well-being beyond the bounds of divinity.
To see that he does, consider the following passage in the second Critique.
After reviewing his argument that morality requires the moral law to
determine the will directly, Kant raises the question: ‘Have we not a word
that does not denote enjoyment, as the word happiness does, but that
nevertheless indicates a satisfaction with one’s existence, an analogue of
happiness that must necessarily accompany consciousness of virtue?’
(KpV, 5: 117). Yes, he says, there is: ‘This word is self-contentment
(Selbstzufriedenheit)’,12which contentment, Kant is clear, is an ‘intellectual
contentment’, as opposed to the ‘aesthetic contentment’ that ‘depends on
the satisfaction of the inclinations’ (KpV, 5: 117–18).
The importance of this passage is easy to overlook, since Kant speaks
here only of contentment rather than well-being. But read in light of my
argument that well-being just is contentment, its true meaning should be
clear. Kant is not merely identifying self-contentment with intellectual
contentment. He is also (and thereby) identifying self-contentment with
intellectual well-being.
Moreover, shortly after this passage, Kant explicitly likens our
self-contentment to God’s blessedness. While he naturally denies that we
can be blessed, since our contentment ‘does not include complete
independence from inclination and need’, Kant does nonetheless claim that
our self-contentment ‘resembles’ blessedness, insofar as it allows us to
approximate, however imperfectly, the ‘self-sufficiency that can be ascribed
only to the supreme being’ (KpV, 5: 118). Kant’s talk here of resemblance
might suggest that all he intends to do is to analogize our self-contentment
and God’s blessedness and not to assert that they are instances of a single
state of intellectual well-being. But Kant’s fuller discussion of blessedness in
his theology lectures provides evidence for the stronger claim. For example,
he there identifies blessedness with the ‘highest degree of self-contentment’
and claims that ‘if this self-contentment were to extend to our entire
existence, it would be called blessedness’ (VpR, 28: 1089–90). These
comments strongly suggest that God’s blessedness is not different in kind
from our self-contentment. The difference consists only in the fact that the
former is a more perfect and complete instance of the kind than the latter.
It seems, then, that intellectual well-being does not belong to God alone.
It also belongs to us.
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Returning, then, to the taxonomy sketched above, I can be more specific
about the identity of the relevant taxa. Well-being has two species:
sensible contentment – happiness – and intellectual contentment – self-
contentment. Since God is a purely intellectual being, his well-being
includes self-contentment alone, under the name ‘blessedness’. And since
humans are both sensible and intellectual beings, their well-being
includes both happiness and self-contentment. We live well, in
part, when we are happy, but we also live well, in part, when we are
self-contented.13
I have arrived, then, at my first major conclusion. There is more to even
human well-being than happiness. There is also self-contentment.
My second major conclusion – that morality is intrinsically related to
self-contentment and thereby to well-being – remains to be established.
5
Notice, though, that the course of my argument so far does at least push
in this direction. For in the very passage in which Kant introduces
self-contentment, he says of this state that it ‘necessarily accompanies
consciousness of virtue’, understood as ‘consciousness of freedom as an
ability to follow the moral law with an unyielding disposition’ (KpV, 5:
117). Why, though, should morality be thought to give rise to content-
ment, and necessarily so? Kant’s answer seems to be that, since morality
involves ‘mastery over one’s inclinations’, it necessarily allows for
‘independence from them and so too from the discontent that always
accompanies them’ (KpV, 5: 118). This is a familiar enough thought
relying on a familiar enough mechanism. Inclination breeds discontent-
ment. Thus by diminishing the former, one thereby diminishes the latter.
Indeed, in adverting to this mechanism, Kant seems to be aligning himself
with a long and distinguished tradition in moral philosophy, according to
which morality promises peace by delivering us from the tumult of
inclination.14
While this pacification story is certainly venerable and, I think, plausible,
Kant’s appropriation of it is nonetheless problematic. This is because, as
we have seen, self-contentment is supposed to be a distinctively intellec-
tual state. But if self-contentment is as I have just described it, it is hard to
see how this could be so. Of course, it is the intellect that effects the
relevant contentment by mastering inclination, but this does not imply
that what is effected is thereby intellectual. After all, whether you achieve
contentment by subduing your inclinations or by satisfying them, the
quality of your condition remains a function of your sensible state – of the
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presence or, more relevantly, the absence of pathological desire.15 Thus,
it seems, if self-contentment is truly intellectual, and if morality, the
(practical) intellectual activity par excellence, is truly its source, then
there must be a way to connect morality to contentment directly, without
the mediation of inclination. The problem, though, is that Kant does not
seem to countenance any such way. And if not, then it seems that my
ambition to use self-contentment in order to forge an intrinsic link
between morality and well-being must go unfulfilled.
Now I admit that Kant’s second Critique comments about
self-contentment do complicate my argument. That said, I do not think
that these comments should settle the matter. For if we take seriously
the account of divine contentment I sketched above, then we must admit
that Kant is at least conflicted here. After all, it is clear enough that
the second Critique characterization of self-contentment as a merely
‘negative satisfaction’, born of morality’s mastery of inclination, does not
apply easily to the case of God (KpV, 5: 117–18). Most obviously, since
God has no inclinations, his self-contentment cannot be a matter of his
mastering them. But neither can it be a matter of his being naturally
free from inclination, since that would allow his intellect no role at
all in generating his contentment, and so would render obscure the sense
in which the resulting state could be intellectual, which of course it
must be. The only contentment suited to God, it seems, is a contentment
that has its source directly in his active intellect. Sensibility can have
nothing to do with it.
Of course, many of Kant’s remarks about God come from lectures, and it
is understandable that one might wish to set them aside when they are at
odds with more canonical works. Nevertheless, as philosophically
engaged readers of Kant – in particular, as readers of Kant concerned
about the connection between morality and well-being – I think it is
worth our while to ask whether there might be more resources available
to Kant than he himself realized, resources that are grounded in the
canonical works but perhaps lead to non-canonical conclusions. And
what we find, I think, is that there are. That is to say, Kant’s own
statements notwithstanding, I think there are credibly Kantian reasons to
understand self-contentment as intellectual in a full-blooded sense: as a
kind of contentment that necessarily accompanies virtue not because,
through morality, we master inclination, but because, through morality,
we engage in an intellectual activity that directly contents us, in more or
less the way it does for God. My task in the remainder of this article is to
explain how this could be so.
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6
Before I do this, however, there is one more problem I must address, since
the barriers to such an account of self-contentment are not merely
textual. They are philosophical too. For consider what this state must be.
To be contented, I have claimed, is to be motivated to remain in one’s
current condition. Thus if the intellectual activity of morality gives rise to
an intellectual contentment directly, this could only be because reason, in
its moral employment, so motivates.
The problem with this proposal, though, is that it does not seem to be
true. After all, moral reason prescribes activity, commanding us to pursue
the apparently interminable tasks of perfecting ourselves, making others
happy and, generally, giving rational and so moral form to a world that
would otherwise lack it. But if this is right, then what Kant says about
inclination and discontentment should apply equally well to reason.
If (sensible) discontentment always accompanies inclination because
inclination motivates one to change one’s condition, then (intellectual)
discontentment should always accompany reason too, and for the very
same reason. The peace that morality gives with one hand, it takes away
with the other; for reason, no less than inclination, is restless.
This is a disconcerting conclusion. But, at least in one way, it should not
be entirely surprising. For if, again, contentment consists in the motiva-
tion to remain in one’s current condition, then it really does seem that any
activity whatsoever – and so, a fortiori, any intellectual and so moral
activity – is necessarily bound up with discontentment. After all, to be
discontented just is to be motivated to change one’s condition. And what,
one might reasonably ask, could it be to be active but to be so motivated?
Underlying this natural question, I surmise, is a natural picture of
activity.16 Consider, for example, the fact that ordinary action has a
teleological and causal structure. We act for ends, and in acting for those
ends, we seek to bring something about. But if so, then it is no mystery
why activity seems bound up with discontentment. Whether I am acting
to slake my thirst or to rectify injustice, I am striving to change my
condition from one in which things are not as I want them to be to one in
which they are. I am thus discontented with my existence and will remain
so until I have achieved my end.
Moreover, once I have achieved my end, I will perforce cease to act. For if
I am acting in order to bring something about, and I succeed in bringing
it about, then there will be nothing left for me to do. Put another way, if
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action is in this way teleological and causal – if production is its sole point
and purpose – then it seems, somewhat paradoxically, as if the very point
of activity is inactivity. What activity, considered as such, aims at is its
own cessation. Of course, I may have other ends to attend to and so other
actions to undertake. But it will be just as true of these, as it was of my
original action, that insofar as I am successful, I will no longer act at all.
In bringing about the end of action, I bring about the end of action.
So long as this exclusively productive picture of activity remains in place,
I think it will be very difficult to understand how morality could content
us and so how self-contentment is so much as possible. But as this
phrasing suggests, there is a way out: displace the productive picture. And
this, I think, is exactly what Kant does in his account of moral activity. A
Kantian agent can be at once morally active and intellectually contented
because there is more to moral activity than simply bringing
something about.
7
To see this, consider the fact that moral action issues from a good will.17
This is important because, though an agent of good will does aim to bring
something about – all activity, for Kant, is to that extent productive – we
do not evaluate her activity solely in light of this aim. As Kant says in
Groundwork I, ‘a good will is not good because of what it effects or
accomplishes, because of its fitness to obtain some proposed end, but
only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself’ (G, 4: 394). Value
here marks a success condition. Good willing is, in itself, successful.
This is not, of course, to say that if I rush to your aid because I see that it
would be good to do so, I will actually succeed in helping you. I may well
not. I could trip, be knocked over by a rude pedestrian or simply take too
long. But insofar as my action follows from a good will, it seems that
I have acted well, and so successfully, simply in virtue of acting as I did.
Kant explains this remarkable feature of good willing by adverting to ‘the
principle of volition in accordance with which the action is done’ (G, 4:
400). That is, the good will is good not because of what it wills but
because of how it wills – not because of the state of affairs to be produced
but because of the way in which the agent represents that state of affairs,
her practically effective conception of its value. Kant refines his account
of this contrast in Groundwork II, when he introduces the distinction
between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical impera-
tives pronounce actions good, but only as a means to something else.
Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, pronounce actions good in
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themselves (G, 4: 414). The action is worth undertaking not because (or
not only because) the action will produce some effect that the agent
welcomes but because of some intrinsic feature of the action itself. The
relation between this distinction and the good will should be obvious. For
if the goodness of the good will does not depend on the effect but on the
willing, then the agent of good will must be acting in accordance with a
categorical rather than a hypothetical imperative. She must act as she
does not simply because her action produces some desirable consequence.
She must act as she does because her action is in itself good.
What this shows is that if there is such a thing as good willing, then the
exclusively productive model of activity is at best incomplete.18 It cannot
capture one of the fundamental features of good willed action, i.e. that
such action is done for its own sake. Again, this is not to deny that in such
cases the production of some state of affairs is an end. Surely it is, and
insofar as the action does not produce the effect, it is, in one respect, a
failure. But this is just to say that the success conditions of action are not
simple but complex. There are, in fact, two distinct dimensions of success
along which we evaluate such actions, since there are, so to speak, two
ends at play here: the end that is the action and the end that is the effect to
be produced by the action.
One important consequence of this revision of the success conditions of
action is that we are no longer bound to think, as on the exclusively
productive model, the paradoxical thought that the aim of activity,
considered as such, is inactivity. When one thinks that the sole point of
acting is to bring something about, it is very natural to think that success
in activity can only mean the cessation of activity. If, in bringing some-
thing about, you have done everything you set out to do, then why would
you still be doing anything? It would seem, quite literally, pointless.
But on the more complicated model exemplified by action that issues
from a good will, this is not necessarily the case. The point of the action is
no longer exhausted by the production of the effect. Rather, the
point is precisely to engage in the action, since the action is in itself good.
In such cases, then, there is a dimension of success that is continuous
with the action itself and does not merely await its completion.19 And
so the paradox dissolves: the aim of activity is, at least in such cases,
activity itself.
In liberating us from the exclusively productive model of activity, good
willing also, I think, liberates us from the thought that activity and
discontentment are necessarily bound together. For although the agent of
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good-willed action is still, in one sense, motivated to change her
condition, there is another sense in which she is not motivated to change
her condition at all. Rather, she is motivated to remain in her condition,
since that condition, the condition of acting, is one that she wants to be in.
That is to say, the agent of a good willed action wants to act as she is
acting and is to that extent contented. This is (part of) what it is to be such
an agent.20
Care is needed here, since the complexity of the success conditions of
good willing can easily lead to confusion about the kind of contentment it
allows. Consider, for example, the good-willed traveller who helps her
fellow passenger put his suitcase in the overhead bin. She does what she
does for its own sake and so wants to act as she is acting. But what is it
exactly that she wants? What condition is it in which she is motivated to
remain? One natural answer is that what she wants is to put the bag in the
bin. Understood in the most straightforward way, however, this cannot
be quite right. For if it were, then it would seem reasonable for the
traveller to stretch out her action as long as possible, taking her sweet
time in lifting the bag or pulling it out just as soon as she pushes it in.
After all, if what she wants is to put the bag in the bin, then the bag’s
actually being in the bin is a threat to what she wants and so something
she should resist. Surely, though, this is perverse.
But if the good-willed agent does not simply want to keep doing the very
same action, in what sense, then, is she motivated to remain in her current
condition? And, moreover, in what sense could this condition be a
condition of acting? To answer these questions, we must attend more
closely to the nature of good willing. While the generous traveller does, of
course, want to put the bag in the bin, it is important to remember the
description under which she wants to do this: she wants to do it because it
is in itself good. This description matters because it makes clear that what
the agent of good will wants is not simply to do discrete things like
putting bags in bins, or telling the flight attendant that she is prepared to
assume the responsibilities of sitting in an exit row. Rather, she wants
to do all these discrete things because they are good. That is, qua
good-willed agent, she wants to act as it is good to act. This may sound
trivial but it is not. For how it is good to act can and does change. At one
moment, it is good to put the bag in the bin. But once the bag is actually in
the bin, then it is now good to do something else, e.g. to sit down and
clear the aisle so that other people can move through. Properly speaking,
then, the condition the good-willed agent is motivated to remain in is
nothing but the condition of good willing itself, and she remains in this
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condition by undertaking those actions that are in themselves good.
Considered individually, such actions may stop, but good willing
goes on.
It is in this sense, then, that the agent of good-willed action wants to act as
she is acting and is to that extent contented. She wants to act as it is good
to act, whatever that turns out to be.21 On the exclusively productive
model, by contrast, what the agent wants is not to act – not really. What
she wants is the existence of a certain state of affairs, and her action is
simply a means to that end. This is why it makes perfect sense for her to
cease acting after she has brought about that state of affairs, or, perhaps,
never to act at all, if she were self-sufficient and so in need of nothing.
Thus it seems that introducing this distinction in action requires
introducing a correlative distinction in contentment. On the one hand,
there is a kind of action whose end is entirely beyond itself. The kind of
contentment that seems suited to this kind of action is the contentment of
rest: a subject is motivated to remain in her current condition, and thus
contented, because she wants to do nothing. On the other hand, there is a
kind of action whose end is itself. The kind of contentment that seems
suited to this kind of action is the contentment of activity: a subject is
motivated to remain in her current condition, and thus contented,
because she wants do what she is doing, i.e. acting as it is good to act.
So long as one thinks of action only according to the exclusively
productive model, the first kind of contentment will seem the only one
available and the tension between contentment and activity will
seem inescapable. But once one acknowledges action that is not entirely
productive, action such as that involved in good willing, the second kind
of contentment seems available too.22
It is this availability that allows us, at last, to understand how
self-contentment is possible, not merely in the attenuated sense of being
caused by moral reason’s mastery of inclination but in the full-blooded
sense of being generated directly by morally rational activity itself.
As I noted in §6, it is not easy to see how there could be such a state, since
it is not easy to see how reason, in its moral employment, could motivate
an agent to remain in her current condition rather than to change it. But,
as I have just argued, this difficulty should dissipate once one recognizes
that moral action issues from a good will and so is done for its own sake.
A good-willed agent can be motivated to remain in her current condition,
and can thus be self-contented, because, as a good-willed agent, she
wants to act as she is acting.
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8
I am now in a position to bring my argument to a close. Recall that my
aim has been to show that morality and well-being can be intrinsically
related in a Kantian framework. It has seemed otherwise because it has
seemed obvious that the Kantian account of well-being is exhausted by
the Kantian account of happiness, in which case morality’s role in a life
well led is entirely dependent on its sensible influence. But what seems
obvious is false. There are good reasons to think that the Kantian account
of well-being is not exhausted by the Kantian account of happiness.
Well-being is a genus with two species: one sensible – happiness – and one
intellectual – self-contentment. Thus while morality, as rational activity,
can only be extrinsically related to happiness, it can be intrinsically
related to self-contentment and thereby to well-being.
So far, this is just a possibility proof. And, as I explained above, there are
both textual and philosophical reasons to worry whether what is possible
is also actual. But, I have argued, these worries can be addressed by
drawing connections that are available to Kant but which Kant himself
does not draw. Though Kant may in fact think of self-contentment as a
merely negative satisfaction that results from mastery of inclination, he
need not think this. Rather, given his account of moral activity as
self-sustaining, it is open to him, and so to his followers, to regard
self-contentment more positively, as the active contentment that consists
in an agent’s acting as she wants to act because it is good to do so.
Moreover, since this motivational commitment is part of the nature of
moral activity, it follows that moral activity is not merely necessarily
related to self-contentment. It is intrinsically related to self-contentment
and thereby to well-being.
This is a limited conclusion but an important one. It is limited because it
concerns morality’s relation to just one aspect of our well-being, self-
contentment. It says nothing of the other, happiness.23 It is important,
however, because it allows the Kantian to say something that it seemed
she could not, i.e. that morality is in and of itself a source of well-being,
something that makes a life go well. Again, this is not to say that morality
is sufficient for well-being, in the sense of providing us everything we need
for a life well led. Something like this may be true for God, whose only
contentment is self-contentment, but it is not true for us. Since we
remain ‘always dependent with regard to what is required for a complete
contentment with [our] condition’, we cannot do without happiness,
however self-contented we may be (KpV, 5: 84).24Nevertheless, in acting
morally, in being self-contented, we do partake, however imperfectly, in
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the independent life of the divine. And so, whatever other benefits and
burdens morality might bring, it is also and truly its own reward.25
Notes
1 On this way of thinking, we may – and perhaps even must – hope for a future happiness,
insofar as we make ourselves worthy of it. That said, realizing this hope is beyond our
power as mere mortals. Hope shades into faith, ethics into religion.
2 This is a dominant theme in Barbara Herman’s interpretation. See Herman 1993a,
1993b, 2007a, 2007b. See also Baron 1999 and Korsgaard 1996.
3 I use the following abbreviations for and translations of Kant’s works: Critique of Pure
Reason = KrV (Kant 1998); Critique of Practical Reason = KpV (Kant 1997a);
Critique of the Power of Judgment = KU (Kant 1996a); Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals = G (Kant 1997b); The Metaphysics of Morals = MS (Kant
1996b); Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View = A (Kant 2006); Lectures on
Metaphysics = VM (1997c); Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion = VpR
(Kant 1996d). I cite the first Critique with the standard ‘A/B’ pagination and the other
works according to the Academy edition pagination, which is included in the volumes of
translations utilized.
4 I assume throughout that Kant’s concept of well-being (Wohl) is restricted, as he says, to
the worth of one’s condition rather than the worth of one’s person, to being well
(Wohlbefinden) rather than acting well (Wohlverhalten) (KpV, 5: 60–1, 88; G, 4: 442,
449–50). It is not obvious how to understand these contrasts, but acknowledging Kant’s
reliance on them is important, since (i) it makes clear that his concept of well-being is not
as general as it might at first appear, and (ii) it allows for the possibility of a concept of
well-being that is, in the present context, the exact opposite of Kant’s: one that does
concern personality and action. Indeed, one might think that such a concept is not
merely possible; it is actual. For example, it seems at the fore in ancient discussions of
eudaimonia, understood in broadly perfectionist terms, such as living – in the sense of
acting – well, performing one’s function, realizing one’s nature, etc. Of course, such
thoughts are not foreign to Kant, as is evident from his frequent discussion of our
vocation as rational beings, of the conditions under which we are true to our
proper selves, etc. (KpV, 5: 87,G, 4: 458). But, notably, these thoughts do not belong to
his discussion of well-being. Rather, they belong to his discussion of morality. If this is
right, then we must be very careful in understanding Kant’s relation to other figures and
philosophies. We cannot assume that key terms are univocal, and so we cannot assume
that apparent conflicts are genuine. I hope to expand on these points in future work.
5 Notably, God does have pleasures – just not sensible ones (VpR, 28: 1059–60).
See Elizondo 2014 for further discussion of non-sensible pleasures.
6 To be clear, it does not follow from the fact that we lack cognition of God that we may think
of him however wewish. Thus, though our thoughts aboutGod are, in a certain sense, merely
speculative, Kant thinks that such thoughts can nonetheless constitute genuine understanding
of the concept of God. For discussion of Kant’s philosophical theology, though with a more
metaphysical than psychological emphasis, see Wood 1978.
7 For other mentions of satisfaction (Zufriedenheit) in the context of happiness, see G, 4:
393,MS, 6: 387 and VpR, 28: 1060.
8 This is how others translate the term – e.g. Guyer and Matthews in Kant 1996a, Wood
and di Giovanni in Kant 1996c, and Ameriks andNaragon in Kant 1997c – and it is how
Gregor herself translates it in other places. Hereafter, I will amend Gregor’s translations,
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as necessary, so that Zufriedenheit and its cognates are always translated by
‘contentment’ and its cognates.
9 Indeed, I think this notion is dominant throughout Kant’s work, explaining why he so
readily associates inclination, feeling and need (KpV, 5: 26, 118; G, 4: 418, 428).
I discuss these associations in §3.
10 One might be sceptical of this suggestion on the grounds that contentment itself is a formal
notion, and so is no candidate at all – never mind a good one – for well-being, construed
substantively. I think such scepticism is misplaced. If contentment were formal, in a way
that would spell trouble for my argument, then we should expect the identification of well-
being and contentment to be trivial. But this is not so. It is clearly a substantive (and
controversial) claim that whatmakes an agent’s life gowell for her is her beingmotivated to
remain in her current condition. Of course, it is true that the conditions of contentment are
left open by the account of contentment presented here: what makes one agent contented
may not make another agent contented. But this does not make contentment formal. Or, at
least, it does not make it any more formal than the satisfaction of inclinations, which
similarly leaves it open which inclinations a given agent has.
11 My point here is simply to connect inclination to contentment. It is not to give a full
account of this connection –what to say, for example, about inclinations that we do not
want to satisfy. One thing, however, is worth noting. If all there were to contentment
were the removal of need, then it would seem that, Kant’s emphasis on satisfaction
notwithstanding, there would be no principled reason to prefer satisfying the
inclinations to extirpating them. Both strategies would be, so to speak, different paths
to the same destination. The only basis for deciding between them, then, would be how
easily they get us where we are going.
12 Gregor translates Selbstzufriedenheit as ‘contentment with oneself’. I prefer the simpler
and more literal ‘self-contentment’. In this I follow Wood and di Giovanni in
Kant 1996c.
13 Victoria Wike 1994 similarly argues that there are two kinds of well-being in Kant, one
sensible and one intellectual. Since her primary interest, however, is in sensible
well-being, in happiness, she does not devote much attention to intellectual well-being,
to self-contentment; and to the extent that she does, she seems to take for granted the
negative characterization of self-contentment that I go on to discuss and then challenge.
14 This alignment is clear from Kant’s frequent references in these passages to the
Epicureans and Stoics.
15 See again my discussion of inclination and contentment in §3.
16 This natural picture is also reflected in a number of philosophical accounts of action,
which connect motivation with some privative condition: dissatisfaction, uneasiness,
suffering, etc. See, for example, Hobbes 1994: 34, 57; Locke 1979: 251–2; and
Schopenhauer 1969: 196.
17 Though the following exposition of good willing is adequate for present purposes, I pass
over many important details. See Elizondo 2013 for further discussion of the will and
what makes it good.
18 Christine Korsgaard has also recently emphasized the way in which Kant rejects an
exclusively productive model of activity, of the sort she attributes to Mill, in favour of a
more Aristotelian alternative (Korsgaard 2009: 8–18). She does not, however, connect
his view of activity to his view of well-being.
19 Or, one might say, the action is, in one respect, complete throughout rather than merely
brought to completion. This seems to be the way Aristotle thinks of energeia, of which
virtuous activity is a prime example (Aristotle 1999: 157–8; 1174a13–b14). I mean my
Kant to be quite close to Aristotle in this respect.
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20 To be clear, though the good-willed agent is contented in acting as she does, she does not
act as she does because she seeks contentment. She acts as she does because it is in itself
good – and that is why she is contented. Thus my claim here does not threaten the purity
of moral motivation. On the contrary, it presupposes it.
21 One might ask here whether Kant’s famous scepticism about self-knowledge creates a
problem for the very close connection I am trying to forge between good willing and
contentment. I do not think it does. My argument turns on the claim that good willing is
a kind of activity that constitutively involves certain motivational commitments,
e.g. wanting to act as one is acting because it is good to do so. That we may think we are
involved in this activity when we are not does not itself call this characterization into
question. Indeed, I think this kind of distinction between the epistemic and metaphysical
conditions of activity is exactly the sort of thing Kant has in mind at the beginning of
Groundwork II, where he offers one of his most famous statements about our
psychological opacity (G, 4: 406–7). That experience furnishes no certainty that we have
ever acted from duty is no reason to doubt that good willing constitutively involves
motivation of this kind.
22 It is worth noting that this distinction between kinds of contentment can be plausibly
mapped onto the distinction between our rational, or ‘higher’, and sensible, or ‘lower’,
faculties. What the higher/lower distinction is supposed to track in all of these cases is the
activity or passivity of the subject with respect to the exercise of her faculties. On the
practical side, the distinction mainly tracks the difference between motivation through
rational concepts, i.e. volition, and motivation through inclination and feeling. If there
is, then, a kind of contentment that is tied to rational nature, to the will, we should
expect it to be, like rational nature itself, active. If there is a kind of contentment that is
tied to sensible nature, to inclination and feeling, we should expect it to be, like sensible
nature itself, passive. And this, it seems, is exactly what we find in the distinction
between the two kinds of contentment considered above.
23 Though recall, as I noted in my introduction, that I am largely in agreement with the
good work that has been done recently on the relation between morality and happiness.
To this extent, my position is better thought of as a friendly supplement to this work
rather than an alternative to it.
24 Interestingly, this seems to be one of Kant’s main complaints against the Stoics. They in
effect cast their sage as a god, as an agent whose well-being consists completely in
self-contentment and not at all in happiness (KpV, 5: 127).
25 For helpful discussion of issues relevant to this article, I thank Tyler Burge,
John Carriero, Jorah Dannenberg, Michael Della Rocca, Jay Elliott, Barbara Herman,
Yannig Luthra, JohnMcCumber, StephenWhite andmembers of the UCLA EthicsWriting
Workshop. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal for their comments.
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